Implicit measures of the gender-science stereotype are often better than explicit measures in predicting relevant outcomes. This finding could reflect a discrepancy between implicit and explicit stereotypes, but an alternative is that the implicit measure is sensitive to constructs other than the stereotype. Analyzing an archival dataset (total N = 478,550), we found that self-reported liking of science versus liberal arts was the best predictor of the gender-science Implicit Association Test (IAT). In a re-analysis of a previous study and a replication of another study, we found that evidence for the IAT's advantage over explicit stereotypes in predicting relevant outcomes disappeared when controlling for self-reported liking.
stronger implicit stereotypes predicted worse math performance and achievement, and weaker identification with math and science. Among men, the implicit stereotypes sometimes had no predictive value, and on other studies, stronger implicit stereotypes predicted better performance, achievements, and identification with math and science.
Seventeen of the studies listed in Appendix A compared the relation of a third outcome measure with implicit versus explicit stereotypes. Fifteen of those studies found that the implicit stereotype had a stronger relation with an outcome measure than the explicit stereotype. The superiority of the implicit stereotypes could reflect a unique role for automatic activation of stereotypes in judgment and behavior. Lane et al. (2012) argued that "sincere and conscious beliefs that men and women are equally well-suited for STEM fields do not preclude internalization of these beliefs at a less conscious level" (p. 222). Likewise, Muzzatti and Agnoli (2007) speculated that the implicit gender-science stereotype is present even when "participants are not aware of (or deny) the stereotype" (p. 758). It was further speculated that implicit stereotypes "shape choices by subtly constraining preferences without the individual's awareness or conscious exertion of choice" (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002, p. 50) . Moreover, Nosek and Smyth (2011) argued that implicit stereotypes can shape certain outcomes (e.g., math engagement and achievement) through mechanisms that operate "under the surface".
Thus, it is common to interpret the advantage of implicit measures of the genderscience stereotype over their explicit counterparts as revealing the important role of automatic activation of stereotypes in those areas. In this article, we suggest that an alternative account is as likely. According to that alternative, the measure used so far for measuring the implicit gender-science stereotype is not the implicit counterpart of the common explicit stereotype measures. In addition to stereotypes, the implicit measure taps other constructs linked to science-related behavior and intentions. Those constructs, rather than implicit processes or constructs, might be the reason for the superiority of the implicit measure over the explicit stereotype measures in predicting important outcomes.
Implicit stereotypes are almost exclusively measured with indirect measures that are considered sensitive to mental associations, mainly the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) . In all the studies that we found, the implicit gender-science stereotype was measured with the IAT (or an IAT variant) Masculine/Feminine, Men/Woman) . It is not obvious that the implicit/explicit distinction is the only difference between such an IAT and a measure of the belief that, in comparison to women, men are better or are more interested in science. Many other beliefs could map into the gender/science associations. Based on that notion, the original goal of the present research was to test a simple hypothesis: self-reported associations would be more strongly related to the IAT than self-reported gender-science beliefs. Such a result would cast doubt on the common interpretation of previous findings that the IAT was better than selfreported beliefs in predicting important outcomes. Perhaps those results reflected a superiority of associations over beliefs, not the superiority of implicit constructs over explicit constructs.
In the present research, we analyzed a large sample of participants (N = 478,550) to test whether self-reported associations are related to the IAT more than self-reported beliefs pertaining to the gender-science stereotype. Although the analyses confirmed our hypothesis, they also found that self-reported liking of science was related to the IAT even stronger than self-reported associations. This finding suggests that the advantage of the gender-science IAT over explicit gender-science beliefs in predicting relevant outcomes might reflect only the advantage of personal attraction over gender-science beliefs in predicting those outcomes, not the advantage of implicit constructs. In the second part of the present investigation, we searched for evidence that the IAT has any advantage over self-reported stereotypes, after controlling for self-reported liking.
Method Participants
Participants were volunteers who completed the gender-science IAT demonstration task in the Project Implicit website (implicit.harvard.edu; Nosek, 2005) between January 13th, 2003 and December 31st, 2013. We excluded participants who did not indicate their gender. We separated the dataset to 11 studies, one for each year, because the self-report measures changed over time (see Table 1 for details). (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) . Positive scores indicated faster performance when words related to males and science shared the same key than when words related to females and science shared the same key.
Self-Report Measures. Participants answered direct questions related to their own attitudes about science and liberal arts, and about their beliefs regarding gender differences in those subjects. We analyzed only questions relevant to the present investigation.
Self-reported associations. Participants reported how much they associated science with males versus with females, and how much they associated liberal arts with males versus females. The response scales changed over the years, but always ranged from strongly female to strongly male. The self-reported association score was the difference between these two items, larger numbers indicating stronger association of science with males and liberal arts with females. why "Women hold a smaller portion of the science and engineering faculty positions at top research universities than do men". One factor pertained to ability: "Different proportions of men and women are found among people with the very highest levels of math ability".
Participants rated how important that factor was in explaining this frequency difference, on a 5-point scale.
Beliefs about natural interest. In 2007-2013 participants rated, on a 5-point scale, the importance of the factor "On average, men and women differ naturally in their scientific interest" in explaining the abovementioned frequency difference.
Beliefs about prevalence. In years 2007-2013, participants estimated how many out of ten men at U.S. universities graduate with a scientific major, and answered the same question about women. The difference between the two responses was the prevalence score.
Personal Liking. Participants reported, on a 5-point scale, how much they like science and how much they like liberal arts. We computed a preference for the topic stereotypically associated with the participant's gender.
Personal Importance. In years 2007-2013, participants rated, on a 5-point scale, how important it was for them to become knowledgeable in science, math, and liberal arts. We averaged the importance of science and math together, and computed a difference score indicating preference of becoming knowledgeable in the topic stereotypically associated with the participant's gender.
Results
The scores were stable over the years (see Appendix B), with the IAT showing a positive score (Mmin = 0.34, Mmax = 0.38). Figure 1 shows highly consistent rank order of the correlations of the IAT with the different self-report measures. In all years, the IAT was more strongly related to self-reported associations (rmin = .198, rmax = .218, minimum and maximum values are from the eleven correlations computed for the eleven samples) than reported beliefs about natural differences between the genders in math ability (rmin = .035, rmax = .119), in interest in science (rmin = .056, rmax = .087), and in estimated prevalence of students who major in science (rmin = .137, rmax = .161). These results were replicated among women and among men (Figures 2a and 2b ).
Unexpectedly, two sets of questions were related to the IAT more strongly than selfreported associations ( Figure 1 and Table 2 ). These were self-reported liking (rmin = .217, rmax = .290), and self-reported importance (rmin = .228, rmax = .246). These relations indicated that stronger men/science and women/liberal arts associations predicted stronger preference for science among men and stronger preference for liberal arts among women. Self-reported liking had the strongest relations to the IAT, and as Figures 2a and 2b show, this superiority was more pronounced among women than among men (even among men, personal liking had the strongest correlation with the IAT in 10 of the 11 studies). Self-reported importance and self-reported liking were strongly related (rmin = .607, rmax = .621). In all the years, selfreported liking and importance were related to the IAT significantly more than to selfreported beliefs about natural differences between the genders in math ability (liking: rmax = .135; importance: rmax = .053), in interest in science (liking: rmax = .111; importance: rmax = .080), and in estimated prevalence of students in science majors (liking: rmax = .094 ; importance: rmax = .080).
We also used multiple regression analyses to predict the IAT score, in each year, from self-reported associations, ability stereotype beliefs, interest stereotype beliefs, prevalence stereotype beliefs, and personal liking. In all years, reported liking shared the largest unique variance with the IAT, and reported associations was always the second-best predictor (Figures 3a and 3b show separate results for men and women). The consistency of the ranking of predictors attests for their statistical reliability. The chances of one predictor being stronger than another predictor in 11 studies, when there is actually no difference between the two, is p = .0009765625 (2*(1/2 11 )). The results so far show that direct reports about mental associations were related to the IAT more than self-reported beliefs about stereotypes. Unexpectedly, the IAT and selfreported preference for the topic stereotypically associated with the participant's gender were related to each other more than each of these measures was related to other self-reported beliefs and associations. Therefore, perhaps previous findings that the IAT is better than selfreport measures in predicting important outcomes is due to the IAT's relation to personal liking, which, in turn, is a better predictor of science-related outcomes than gender-science beliefs. To refute that possibility, we returned to previous research that found an advantage of the IAT, and tested whether the evidence for this advantage persists even when controlling for self-reported liking.
Predicting Math Performance
Nosek and Smyth (2011) We used PROCESS macro for simple mediation (Model 4) for SAS (Hayes, 2013) to find unstandardized estimates with 95% confidence intervals (CI) of the reduction in the effect of each stereotype measure on the SAT difference, due to controlling for attitudes. We entered the IAT as the independent variable, attitudes as a mediator, SAT as the outcome, and explicit stereotypes as a covariate. We replaced the roles of the IAT and the explicit stereotypes when testing the explicit stereotype. In the present context, rather than mediation effects, this analysis tested whether the relation between each stereotype measure and the 
Predicting Plans to Pursue Science
Lane et al. (2012) found that the gender-science IAT predicted students' plans to pursue science versus humanities (r = .34, p < .0001) better than the self-reported stereotype (r = .12, ns), Williams' t(150) = 2.158, p = .03. We repeated that study with similar materials and procedure, adding attitude and importance measures, measured and scored identically to our main present study (full details about the replication are in Appendix C, and at osf.io/vc68r). We repeated the same analysis strategy as before. When we partialled out shared variance with attitudes, the IAT/pursuit relation (r = .095, p = .032) was no longer reliably stronger than the explicit stereotype/pursuit relation (r = .019, p = .662), Williams' t(511) = 1.251, p = .212.
General Discussion
Research about gender-science stereotypes has often found that implicit measures of the gender-science stereotype are better than explicit measures in predicting performance, motivation, intentions, self-concept, and decision making related to math and science. It is common to interpret such findings as revealing the important role that automatic activation of stereotypes plays in those areas. In this article, we challenge that interpretation. Had previous research used an IAT with the concepts science/liberal arts, pleasant/unpleasant to measure of implicit gender-science stereotype, many would have doubted a claim that discrepancies between implicit and explicit gender-science stereotype reflect discrepancies between implicit and explicit constructs or processes. It would not seem that the only difference between the implicit measure and self-reported gender-science beliefs is their sensitivity to automatic versus deliberate processes. We suggest that this threat also applies to the actual measure that has been used so far to assess the implicit gender-science stereotype, an IAT with the concepts science/liberal arts, male/female. Perhaps that IAT taps into different constructs than those tapped by the explicit measures used in research on the gender-science stereotype.
We suspected that previous findings about discrepancies between the implicit and the explicit gender-science stereotype might have reflected discrepancies between associations and beliefs, rather than between implicit and explicit constructs. Indeed, we found that people's direct report on their mental associations between gender and science had a stronger correlation with the IAT than any self-reported belief. That finding favors previous research that measured self-reported associations (e.g., Nosek et al., 2009 ) over research that measured only beliefs (e.g., Ramsey & Sekaquaptewa, 2011) as an investigation of implicit/explicit discrepancies rather than associations/beliefs discrepancies.
Unexpectedly, our research also found that the IAT's strongest relation was not with self-reported associations but with self-reported personal liking of science in comparison to liberal arts. Importantly, that self-report measure was related to the IAT more than to selfreported stereotypic beliefs. Thus, whereas the explicit gender-science stereotype has very little to do with people's self-reported liking of science, the gender-science IAT is related to self-reported liking more than to any other belief. Nosek, 2014; Nosek, 2005) and stereotypes (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005) . Further, across studies, among woman participants, these implicit/explicit relations were weaker than the relations observed between the IAT and selfreported attitudes towards science (rmin = .15, rmax = .35), and self-reported identification with science (rmin = .17, rmax = .36). Among men, previous results were less conclusive than our present findings (IAT/liking: rmin = .01, rmax =.35; IAT/identity: rmin = .01, rmax = .24).
Our results, mostly supported by a cross-study overview of previous research, are compatible with the possibility that the gender-science IAT and self-reported gender-science stereotypes (or associations) are different not only in automaticity/controllability of the processes that influence them or the implicitness/explicitness of the constructs that they reflect. These measures are also different in the specific beliefs or attitudes that they capture.
Whereas the explicit measure captures people's beliefs about gender and science, the IAT is also related to personal attraction to science (versus non-science topics). Therefore, a difference between specific beliefs and attitudes, rather than a difference in controllability or implicitness, might explain previous findings that implicit gender-science stereotypes are better than explicit gender-science stereotypes in predicting important outcome variables.
An overview of previous research finds that, indeed, most of the outcomes that were predicted better by the gender-science IAT than by the explicit gender-science measures are linked to liking math and science. Among those outcomes were plans and intentions to pursue (Nosek et el., 2002; Nosek & Smyth, 2011) , math performance, and the desire to pursue math-related careers (Kiefer & Sekaquaptewa, 2007b; Ramsey & Sekaquaptewa, 2011) , math self-perceived ability and math participation (Nosek & Smyth, 2011) , and sensitivity to stereotype threat (Galdi, Cadinu, & Tomasetto, 2013; Kiefer & Sekaquaptewa, 2007a) .
People who like science are more likely to perceive science abilities as important, plan to pursue science, choose a science major, engage in a related activity, and reach more successful achievements in that activity. Regarding sensitivity to stereotype threat, women with lower grades in math and those who perceive math-related abilities as relatively unimportant are affected to a lesser extent by stereotype threat (Cadinu, Maass, Frigerio, Impagliazzo, & Latinotti, 2003; Steinberg, Okun, & Aiken, 2012) . Therefore, liking math should predict sensitivity to stereotype threat.
The alternative account that we consider here does not argue that the gender-science IAT is not a measure of automatic processes or implicit constructs. Our argument pertains only to the reason for the IAT's superiority over explicit stereotype measures in predicting science-related outcomes. We argue that the predictive advantage that previous research found for the IAT might reflect a stronger relation of the outcome variable with personal attraction to science than with gender-science beliefs, rather than a stronger relation of the outcome variable with implicit than with explicit constructs or processes.
One course of action to refute the argument proposed in the present article is to show that the IAT is a superior predictor of science-related behavior and cognition even when controlling for self-reported liking of science. Following that logic, we re-analyzed data from one previous study (Nosek & Smyth, 2011) and replicated another (Lane et al., 2012) to examine what happens to the advantage of the gender-science IAT over self-report measures in predicting a science-relevant outcome, when attitudes are added to the model. We found that shared variance with attitudes explains much of the variance the IAT shared with the outcome measure (when we controlled for attitudes, the IAT's effect decreased significantly).
We also found that the IAT's advantage over explicit stereotypes was no longer significant when controlling for attitudes. Unfortunately, we did not find a statistical method to test whether the IAT's advantage over the explicit measure was significantly reduced when attitudes were added to the model 1 . Therefore, our findings only failed to refute the alternative account we proposed here, rather than provide more empirical support for that account.
Why 
Limitations and Future Research
The most obvious challenge to our alternative account is the possibility that our findings are just another example for the superiority of the implicit over the explicit genderscience stereotypes in predicting important psychological variables related to math and science (in this case, science-related attitudes). Perhaps the predictive power of the IAT diminishes when controlling for self-reported liking due to shared variance between three 
Summary
The present research found that whereas the gender-science IAT is hardly related to explicit beliefs about gender and science, it is related to personal attitudes and goals pertaining to science. This finding points to the possibility that the IAT's advantage over explicit measures of the gender-science stereotype is not only due to the automaticity versus controllability of the processes that influence each measure or to the implicitness versus explicitness of the constructs captured by each measure. Rather, perhaps it is due to discrepancy in the explicit beliefs and attitudes captured by each measure. The present findings emphasize that much evidence is still missing for understanding the theoretical implications of previous findings about implicit gender-science stereotypes. In order to examine the unique role of implicit gender-science stereotypes, one must measure not only explicit stereotypes, but also self-reported associations and self-reported attraction to math and science. Further, research must examine whether the gender-science IAT predicts Percentage of men that are believed to be good at math minus percentage of women that are believed to be good at math.
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Implicit stereotypes moderated the effect of stereotype threat on performance (β = -.19*) whereas explicit stereotypes did not (ps >.1).
F:
Math test score: .04 Math class difficulty: .36*** Kiefer & Sekaquaptewa, 2007b An average of agreement with the following statements: "It is possible that men have more math ability than do women", "In general, men may be better than women at math", and "I don't think that there are any real
The interaction term between gender identity and implicit stereotypes predicted women's performance in their calculus final exams (β =.27*) and their desire to pursue math-related careers (β = -.32*), whereas explicit stereotype did not (β =.15, β = -.19 respectively). An average of agreement with the following statements: "Men are just better at science than women", "If I were having trouble with a math problem, I would go to a man instead of a woman for help", and an indication of the extent to which the genders differed in skill at sciences and humanities (from men are much better to women are much better). Implicit stereotypes predicted plans to pursue science versus humanities (r = .34***), whereas explicit stereotypes did not (r = .12). The degree to which math and arts are associated with males and females, using semantic differential item (males-female as anchor points).
Not reported The interaction term between gender and implicit stereotypes predicted several variables: implicit (β = -.32**) and explicit (β = -.44***) math attitudes, implicit (β = -.28*) and explicit (β = -.54***) identification with math, and SAT performance (β = -.31**). The interaction term between gender and explicit stereotypes did not show any significant relations. Math stereotyping: An average of agreement with the following statements: "Men are better at math than women are", "Women can achieve as much as men in math". Gender stereotyping: Which statement best describes your belief? From "I strongly associate math with females and arts with males" to "I strongly Math stereotyping: F: .13* M: .14* Gender stereotyping: F: .18* M: .21*
The interaction term between math stereotypes and gender was a better predictor of math-verbal difference SAT scores (β = -.23***) than the interaction term of gender and math stereotypes (β = -.08**). Similar results were found when predicting math engagement: math attitude (I: β = -.25***, E: β = -.11***), math identity (I: β = -.24***, E: β = -.10***), math anxiety (I: β = -.16***, E: β = -.13***), self-perceived ability (I: β = -.20***, E: β = -.14***), and math participation (I: β = -.17***, E: β = -.10***). Park, Cook, & Greenwald, 2001 An average of agreement with statements such as "I think that in general, men are better at math, science and engineering than women", and placing an X on a semantic differential scale closer to the word (male or female) in reference to the fields of math, science, engineering, art and English. An average of agreement with four statements including "It is possible that men have more math ability than do women", "In general, men may be better than women at math", and "I don't think that there are any real gender differences in math ability". An average of the differences between ratings of math and German giftedness among girls and boys (e.g., "Boys are often talented for doing German"), and the statement: "Math/German is rather a typical subject for…" (boys and girls as anchor points).
F: .14 M: .24
Among females, implicit stereotypes were slightly a better predictor for implicit math selfconcept (I: β = -.22*, E: β = -.18*), whereas explicit stereotypes were better than implicit stereotypes in predicting explicit math selfconcept (I: β = -.11*, E: β = -.26*), school grades (I: β = -.19*, E: β = -.22*), and enrollment preferences (I: β = -.15*, E: β = -.25*). Among males, explicit stereotypes were better than implicit stereotypes in predicting school grades (I: β = .13*, E: β = .16*), and only explicit stereotypes predicted explicit math self-concept (I: β = .04, E: β = .28*) and enrollment preferences (I: β = .06, E: β = .32*). (Nosek & Banaji, 2001) . Under Predictive Discrepancy are differences found between the implicit and explicit stereotypes in predicting outcomes related to math and science; I = implicit; E = explicit; M = males; F = Females; # p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, ¬ statistical probability not reported. Behavioral intentions. Participants reported plans to pursue academic subjects by rating their agreement (same 7-pointy scale as before) with three items for science: "I will concentrate in math or a science related subject", "I enjoy reading science literature or watching science programs even if they're not required", and "I doubt I will attend many science lectures out of those required for my courses" (reverse-coded); and two items for humanities: "I will concentrate in a humanities subject" and "I enjoy reading literature or watching programs related to the humanities even if they're not required". We computed a score that reflected stronger plans to pursue the topic stereotypically associated with the participant's gender than to pursue the other topic as the difference between the average of the science items and the humanities items (the direction depended on the participant's gender).
Personal Liking. Similarly to our main study, participants reported how much they like science and how much they like humanities on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly dislike) to 5 (strongly like). The difference between the responses was the attitude score, coded to reflect a preference for the topic associated with the participant's gender over the topic associated with the other gender.
Personal Importance. Similarly to our main study, participants reported how important it was for them to become knowledgeable in science, math, and humanities on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (extremely important). The score was the difference between the average rating of science and math and the humanities rating, coded to reflect an importance of the topic associated with the participant's gender over the topic associated with the other gender.
Procedure. Participants completed the IAT task, followed by a self-report questionnaire of the explicit measures: explicit stereotype, behavioral intentions, self-reported liking of science and humanities, self-reported importance of science, math and humanities, and a question about student status (all presented in a random order). Because they were not relevant for the present research, we excluded measures of gender identity that Lane et al. Table C1 presents descriptive statistics for the measures. As Table C2 shows, in line with our findings in the main study, the IAT/attitudes relation (r = .252, p < .001) was stronger than the IAT/explicit stereotype relation (r = .092, p = .038), Williams' t(511) = 2.845, p = .005, as well as than the explicit stereotype/attitudes relation (r = .137, p = .002), Williams' t(511) = 2.001, p = .046. Similarly, the IAT/importance relation (r = .250, p < .001) was stronger than the IAT/explicit stereotype relation, Williams' t(511) = 2.746, p = .006, and stronger than the explicit stereotype/importance relation (r = .097, p = .027), Williams' t(511) = 2.638 , p = .009.
used.

Results
Replicating Lane et al.'s results, the IAT was a better predictor of pursuit of the topic stereotypically associated with the participant's gender (r = .245, p < .001), than the explicit stereotype (r = .111, p = .012), Williams' t(511) = 2.304, p = .022. We used PROCESS macro for simple mediation (Model 4) for SAS (Hayes, 2013) , to find unstandardized estimates with 95% confidence intervals (CI) of the reduction in the effect of each stereotype measure on pursuit, due to controlling for attitudes/importance. Rather than mediation effects, this strategy was used to test whether the relation between each stereotype measure and pursuit was significantly reduced when controlling (separately) for attitudes and importance. We repeated the same analyses to test the reduction in the stereotype measures' effects due to controlling for attitudes, and due to controlling for importance. These were four tests: for each stereotype measure and for each variable we controlled for (attitude or importance).
When we tested the IAT we controlled for explicit stereotypes, and when we tested the explicit stereotypes we controlled for the IAT.
Bootstrap tests with 10,000 resamples showed that controlling for attitudes Notes. Above the diagonal: correlations in the entire sample; Below the diagonal: correlations in the freshmen restricted sample; Stereotype measures reflect stronger associations of science with men, and humanities with women; More positive value on plans to pursue (difference score), personal liking, and personal importance reflect stronger preference for the topic stereotypically associated with the participant's gender over the other topic; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
